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Abstract
Games of timing aim to determine the optimal defense against a strategic attacker who
has the technical capability to breach a system in a stealthy fashion. Key questions
arising are when the attack takes place, and when a defensive move should be initiated
to reset the system resource to a known safe state.
In our work, we study a more complex scenario called Time-Based Security in which
we combine three main notions: protection time, detection time, and reaction time.
Protection time represents the amount of time the attacker needs to execute the attack
successfully. In other words, protection time represents the inherent resilience of the
system against an attack. Detection time is the required time for the defender to detect
that the system is compromised. Reaction time is the required time for the defender
to reset the defense mechanisms in order to recreate a safe system state.
In the first part of the paper, we study the VERIS Community Database (VCDB)
and screen other data sources to provide insights into the actual timing of security
incidents and responses. While we are able to derive distributions for some of the factors
regarding the timing of security breaches, we assess the state-of-the-art regarding the
collection of timing-related data as insufficient.
In the second part of the paper, we propose a two-player game which captures
the outlined Time-Based Security scenario in which both players move according to
a periodic strategy. We carefully develop the resulting payoff functions, and provide
theorems and numerical results to help the defender to calculate the best time to reset
the defense mechanism by considering protection time, detection time, and reaction
time.
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1 Introduction
On Monday early morning, February 17, 2014, an Ethiopian Airlines co-pilot informed
ground control that he had highjacked flight ET-702 from Addis Ababa to Rome and was
planning to fly the plane over Swiss air space towards Geneva. The plane eventually landed
in Geneva at 6:02am local time. Despite the uncertainty about the motives of the highjacker,
and heightened worries about terrorism, no escort could be provided by the Swiss Air Force
since they do not operate before 8am on weekdays. They also do not operate during lunch
breaks, or on weekends [1].
We are using this opening real-world example to illustrate different strategic components
of a security game unfolding over time. These games of timing help us to understand the
defense against a motivated attacker who has the technical capability to breach a system
in a stealthy fashion. A first key question that then arises is when the attack takes place,
and when a defensive move should be initiated to reset the system resource to a known safe
state. Such scenarios have recently been a new focus of study, for example, with the FlipIt
game [39].
However, the Swiss Air Force example demonstrates that security situations typically
involve more complexity which we aim to capture with a model of Time-Based Security ; a
concept which has been informally introduced by Schwartau in 1999 [36]. In this model,
we combine three main notions: protection time (p), detection1 time (d), and reaction time
(r). Protection time represents the amount of time the attacker needs to execute her attack
successfully. In other words, protection time represents the inherent resilience of the system
against an attack. Detection time is the required time for the defender to detect that his
system has been stealthily compromised. This is an important facet of security decision-
making as evidenced by data indicating that organizations on average fail to detect attacks
for over 225 days [26]. Finally, reaction time is the required time for the defender to reset
his defense mechanisms in order to recreate a safe system state.
1We will use detection time and discovery time interchangeably throughout the paper.
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In the example, the pilot stealthily took ownership of a plane at a particular day and
time when he likely had many previous opportunities during his employment with Ethiopian
Airlines. He then proceeded to direct the plane to his target destination. The total time
to take possession of the plane and to reach the target destination is called the protection
time in our model. The pilot informed ground control about the highjacking, and thereby
significantly shortened the detection time of the defenders. It also changed a stealthy attack
to a known attack. Finally, reaction time was excessive due to the non-responsiveness of the
Swiss Air Force.
In our work, we first study the VERIS2 Community Database (VCDB) [40] to shed light
on the question of the actual timing of security incidents and responses. Based on our VCDB
analysis, we provide the distribution of the detection time for malware activities and hacking
incidents. We also provide a selection of heuristics about the protection time and the reaction
time based on our VCDB analysis. In addition, we screen further data sources to shed
light at the timing of security incidents. Furthermore, motivated by our empirical analysis,
we propose a game-theoretic model for the concept of Time-Based Security. Based on our
model specifications, we carefully derive the resulting payoff functions, and provide numerical
results to help the defender to calculate the best time to reset his defense mechanism and
Nash Equilibrium by considering protection time, detection time, and reaction time. We
anticipate the further development of Time-Based Security to positively impact the study of
security games of timing, as well as security practice.
Roadmap: In Section 2, we discuss related work on security games of timing. In Sec-
tion 3, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of timing for security decision-making
by analyzing data from the VERIS Community Database (VCDB) and other data sources.
In Section 4, we develop our model of time-based security, followed by analytic results in
Section 5. In Section 6, we provide numerical results. We conclude in Section 7.
2VERIS is an acronym for the Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing.
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2 Related Work
Game theory has been used extensively for studying different aspects of security and pri-
vacy [24]. These analyses include, but are not limited to, interdependent security [11, 14, 17]
and privacy [32], uncertainty about the type of the connected clients to a server [9, 22], tim-
ing of security incidents [39], and many privacy issues such as location privacy [8, 37]. One of
the critical aspects of securing resources is the timing of appropriate actions to successfully
thwart attacks. The time-related aspects of security choices have been studied from both
theoretical [3, 33] and empirical perspectives [12, 34, 27]. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no extant research specifically investigating the timing of real-world security
incidents and its connection to the games of timing literature.
The optimal timing of security decisions became a lively research topic with the devel-
opment of the FlipIt game [4, 39]. In FlipIt, two players compete for control of a critical
resource to be gaining continuous benefits. Players take ownership of the resource by making
costly moves (“flips”). However, these moves are under incomplete information about the
current state of possession of the contested resource. In the original FlipIt papers, equilibria
and dominant strategies for basic cases of interaction are studied [4, 39]. Further, extended
versions of FlipIt for periodic strategies have been studied by considering the impact of an
audit move to check the state of the resource [30].
Laszka et al. study FlipIt with non-covert defender moves. They consider both tar-
geting and non-targeting attackers with non-instantaneous moves [20, 19]. To extend the
application of the FlipIt game for multiple contested resources, FlipThem is proposed [18].
FlipThem is also extended to consider the case where the attacker attempts to compromise
enough resources to reach a threshold [21]. Likewise, Pal et al. study a game with multiple
defenders [28]. Farhang and Grossklags [7] propose a game-theoretic model in the tradition
of FlipIt called FlipLeakage where a variable degree of information leakage exists that de-
pends on the current quality of defense. In addition, FlipIt has been studied with resource
constraints placed on both players [44]. This line of work has been enriched by a model
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for dynamic environments with adversaries discovering vulnerabilities according to a given
vulnerability discovery process and vulnerabilities having an associated survival lifetime [15].
Axelrod and Iliev [2] study the timing of cyber-conflict from a different perspective. They
proposed a model for the question of when the resource should be used by the attacker to
exploit an unknown vulnerability. Note that the focus of their proposed model is on the
attacker rather than the defender.
Other researcher teams have studied games with multiple layers in which in addition
to external adversaries the actions of insiders (who may trade information to the attacker
for a profit) need to be considered [10, 13]. Taking a different perspective, a discrete-time
model with multiple, ordered states in which attackers may compromise a server through
cumulative acquisition of knowledge (compared to one-shot takeovers) has been proposed
[43]. Finally, the FlipIt framework has been extended to the context of signaling games to
calculate sender’s (one of the players in the signaling game) prior beliefs about the receiver’s
types (i.e., the second player in the signaling game which has two potential types) [29].
From an empirical point of view, Liu et al. [23] use data from the VERIS Community
Database (VCDB) to predict cybersecurity incidents based on externally observable proper-
ties of an organization’s network. Further, Sarabi et al. [35] try to assess a company’s risk
from security incidents and the distribution of security incidents by using an organization’s
business details. They also use VCDB data for their analysis. Edwards et al. [6] investigate
trends in data breaches by using Bayesian generalized linear models. In their analysis, they
use data from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse [31]. To the best of our knowledge, none of
these studies focus on a detailed investigation of timing-related aspects.
Our theoretical work differs from the previous games of timing literature. We take into
account the Time-Based Security approach in our model by integrating the notions of pro-
tection time, detection time, and reaction time to propose a more realistic game-theoretic
framework. As a result, our work aims to overcome several important simplifications in
the previous literature which would limit their applicability to practical defense scenarios.
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Moreover, in this paper, we focus on the values of protection time, discovery time, and reac-
tion time in different publicly available datasets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work taking this angle during the exploration of datasets and based on the analysis to
propose a theoretical framework.
3 Security Incident Data about Timing
In this section, we discuss empirical data sources which shed light on the question of the
actual timing of security incidents and responses.
In the TBS model, we have three main notions: protection time (p), detection time (d),
and reaction time (r). Our focus is to determine actual values of these parameters in practice.
p represents the amount of time the attacker needs to execute the attack successfully. In
other words, p is the amount of time that the defender can protect the system against an
attack (i.e., the system’s inherent resilience). d is the elapsed time in order for the defender
to recognize that the system is compromised. Finally, we can understand the reaction time,
r, as the required time for the defender to reset/update the defense mechanism in order to
create a safe system state.
We do not expect that available field data will exactly match our definitions, but we
anticipate that existing data sources provide some indication of the magnitude of these
parameters.
3.1 Dataset
A particularly relevant industry report for our work is Verizon’s annual Data Breach Inves-
tigations Report (DBIR) [42]. The report from 2016 draws on more than 100,000 incidents
(3,141 of them are confirmed data breaches) from different sources including the VERIS
Community Database (VCBD) [40]. In particular, the report shows the percent of breaches
for which the time of compromise and the exfiltration time is known, see Figure 1. Time to
5
Verizon 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report 10
Mick was wrong—time is not on our side. 
Rome wasn’t built in a day, but data breaches frequently were. Figure 7 
illustrates how quickly the threat Actor gets in and out of your network. The 
large spikes, however, are driven by very specific threats. The compromise 
time of minutes, while depressing to look at, is actually another reflection of 
the ubiquitous ‘Dridex’ breaches in this year’s dataset. As previously alluded 
to, these cases begin with a phish, featuring an attachment whose mission in 
its malware life is to steal credentials. If you have legit creds, it doesn’t take 
a very long time to unlock the door, walk in and help yourself to what’s in the 
fridge. Conversely, the exfiltration time being so weighted in the ‘days’ category 
is heavily representative of attacks against POS devices where malware is 
dropped to capture, package and execute scheduled exports.
Bad news travels fast, with one exception.
We like this next graph—one line goes one way and the other line goes the 
other way. Actually we would like it even more if the lines took different paths. 
The bad news is, the detection deficit in Figure 8 is getting worse.
Figure 7.
Time to compromise and exfiltration.
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Figure 1: Time to compromise and exfiltration from DBIR report [42]
compromise is defined as the time from the beginning of an attack to the first point at which
a security attribute of an information asset was compromised. Exfiltration refers to the time
from initial compromise to the time when valuable data was taken away from the victim (i.e.,
the first point in time at which non-public data was taken from the victim environment).
Note that in Figure 1, n shows the number of incidents with the available corresponding
timing aspect.
Unfortunately, Figure 1 which stems from the DBIR report is not complemented with
detailed commentary. For example, it is not clear what the sources of incidents are. More-
over, the figure does not provide the exact distribution of compromise time and exfiltration
time. However, the given data suggests that protection time is very short, which is highly
unfavorable from a defender’s perspective.
In the following, we take a closer look at the available data in the VCDB [40], which
likely constitutes a major part of the data used for Figure 1, to provide a more realistic
perspective about the timeline of security breaches and their availability.
The VCDB is currently composed of 5856 reports of publicly disclosed data breaches.
This dataset includes incidents that occurred up to and including 2016. The structure of
entries in the VCDB is based on the Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing
(VERIS) [41] which also provides a description on how to report to the VCDB. Each entry
of the VCDB includes the following: incident timeline, the victim organization, the actor
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and motive, the type of incident, how an incident occurred, the impact of an incident, links
to news reports or blogs documenting the incident. Note that some of these fields are not
mandatory, because a victim organization may not have all the information or may not want
to disclose all the details of an incident. In the following, we only focus on the fields that
are related to our study, which are action, timeline, impact.
The first field that we take into account is “action” that represents information about
the type of attack. In VCDB, there are seven primary categories: “Malware”, “Hacking”,
Social”, “Misuse”, “Physical”, “Error”, and “Environmental”. Each category has additional
fields to provide more information. For example, “Hacking” can be the result of SQL injection
or a brute force attack. Note that based on the VERIS description, it is possible that some
incidents are associated with more than one category.
In our analysis, we only focus on the incidents resulting from “Malware” and/or “Hack-
ing”, since we are primarily interested in cybersecurity incidents caused by a malicious entity.
In VCDB, there are 439 entries with the “Malware” tag and 1655 “Hacking” incidents. Tak-
ing into account that many of these incidents have more than one category, there are 1795
distinct incidents with “Malware” and/or “Hacking” labels, which we consider for further
analysis.
The next field we take into account is “timeline” which provides information about the
timing of security incidents. The timeline field has five sub-fields: “incident date”, “time to
compromise”, “time to exfiltration”, “time to discovery”, and “time to containment”. The
only mandatory part of “timeline” is to provide the year of an incident, while other parts
are optional. Note that there may be different approaches among organizations to measure
incident dates, and VERIS “suggests the point of initial compromise as the most appropriate
option to as the primary date for time-based analysis and trending of incidents”´’ [41].
Furthermore, “incident date” represents the first point at which a security attribute
of an information asset was compromised. However, it is not obvious whether “time to
compromise” has a distinct meaning in the VCDB from incident date. For the entries
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with non-empty time to compromise, the value of time to compromise is equal to incident
date. “Time to exfiltration,” as previously stated, represents the initial compromise to data
exfiltration. It is only available for data compromise incidents. Further, initial compromise
to incident discovery is represented by the “time to discovery” field and the field “time to
containment” shows the initial compromise to containment or restoration.
As we mentioned earlier, we only consider those 1795 entries resulting from “Malware”
activities and/or “Hacking” incidents. 473 of them have at least one additional non-empty
field in addition to the mandatory incident date field. As mentioned previously, every entry
with non-empty time to compromise field has the same value to its corresponding incident
date. Therefore, the time to compromise field does not provide more information about the
attack timing. Note that the timeline unit for other fields, i.e., time to exfiltration, time
to discovery, and time to containment, are “NA”, “Seconds”, “Minutes”, “Hours”, “Days”,
“Weeks”, “Months”, “Years”, “Never”, and “Unknown”. In the following subsections, we
investigate the values of timeline sub-fields to observe how the distribution of our desired
parameters, i.e., p, d, and r, are in practice.
3.2 Discovery Time
With respect to the discovery time, there are 325 entries with non-empty time to discovery
and without “Unknown” or “NA” field value. Some of these 325 entries just provide the unit
of the discovery time, e.g., “Hours”, without specifying the exact value. We also exclude such
entries from our analysis. In total, there are 150 entries with exact values for the discovery
time. In these 150 entries, the average value of discovery time is equal to 198.2539 days. The
maximum value of discovery time is 6 years and the minimum value is 10 hours. Figure 2
represents the distribution of the discovery time in the VCDB given the stated limitations.
In Figure 2(a), the length of each bar is 60 days. The vertical axis represents the cu-
mulative density of discovery time. As an example, Figure 2(a) shows that the discovery
time for 32.67% of all attacks is within 60 days. In Figure 2(b), we take a closer look at
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Figure 2: Distribution of discovery time
the distribution of the discovery time below the average time of the discovery, i.e., 198.2539
days. At this threshold, about 72% of all attacks in the dataset are detected. In this figure,
the length of each bar is equal to 10 days. For example, we observe that within 20 days,
defenders detect about 23.33% of all attacks. Despite the limitations, the distribution of the
discovery time gives us an opportunity to calculate the probability of attack discovery over
time.
For 150 entries, we also have data stating discovery times. Among those, 17 provide also
figures for the impact of the attack (see Table 1). As we see in Table 1, losses associated
with legal and regulatory causes have the most impact compared to other categories of loss.3
3.3 Protection Time and Reaction Time
When considering “Hacking” and/or “Malware” entries for exfiltration time (and excluding
data marked with empty, “NA”, and “Unknown”), we are left with 44 entries; however, only
5 provide concrete values (see Table 2).
Exfiltration time can be construed as the protection time for data compromise events.
While the VCDB does not provide much data about exfiltration times, the data allows for
3Note that one entry (i.e., with incident time 10/2014 ) has a discovery time of 6 years. According to
the VERIS definition, incident time should reflect the point in time when compromise first occurred. But,
it seems that for this entry, incident time does not reflect this value accurately. Our interpretation is that
for this event the incident time likely represents the date at which the incident was discovered.
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Incident Time Discovery Time Employee Asset and Fraud Business Disruption Operating Costs Legal and Regulatory Response and Recovery Overall Amount
5/2005 18 Months Over 100,000 68,000,000 - - 9,700,000 256,000,000 -
2007 2 Months Large 137,000 - - - - 100,000
12/2007 10 Months 1001 to 10000 - - - 140,000,000 - -
7/2011 10 Days 1001 to 10000 - - - 508,000 - -
9/2011 2 Years 11 to 100 - - - 3,000,000 - -
2/2012 5 Months 25001 to 50000 - - - 2,725,000 - -
2012 1 Year 10001 to 25000 - - - - - 72,000,000
4/2013 2 Weeks “Small” - - - 325,000 - 325,000
7/2013 15 Days 10001 to 25000 - 2,100,000 - - 1,600,000 3,700,000 (min)
7/2013 10 Months Unknown - - - - - 1,000,000
11/2013 1 Months Over 100,000 - 148,000,000 - 77,000,000 18,000,000 -
6/2014 1 Month Over 100000 - - 250,000,000 - - -
10/2014 6 Years 1001 to 10000 - - - - 177,000
4/2015 1 Years 1001 to 10000 - - - - - 133,300,000
7/2015 3 Weeks Unknown - - - - - 170,000
8/2015 19 Months 10001 to 25000 - - - 17,300,000 - -
8/2015 2 Years 1001 to 10000 - - - 2,600,000 - 2,600,000
Table 1: Impact of security incidents for entries with discovery time. In VCDB some of the
entries provide the currency unit, while others do not. All of the above incidents are in US
$, except for the incident with incident time 7/2015 which occurred in China and does not
specify the currency unit.
Incident Time Discovery Time Exfiltration Time Containment Time
4/16/2011 Days 2 Days Days
7/18/2011 10 Days 7 Days -
7/24/2013 15 Days 2 Days -
11/15/2013 1 Months 2 Weeks -
4/15/2015 1 Year 2 Months 15 Days
Table 2: Exact value of exfiltration time
a very preliminary first approximation, i.e., that exfiltration (protection) time is lower than
discovery time.
For containment time, we find 258 entries with non-empty fields. After excluding “Un-
known” and “NA” entries, we are left with 175 incidents of which 59 have specific values.
One of these entries has a containment time value of 10 years. This incident took place in
the year 2000 with a discovery time of 4 years. The summary of the breach in the VCDB
is “Nortel was the victim of a years-long network security breach that allowed hackers to
extract its trade secrets, according to a veteran of the bankrupt Canadian telco systems biz.”
We exclude this entry from our data for calculating the distribution of the containment time.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of these 58 entries. In Figure 3(a) the length of each bar
is 2 days. As we see in this figure, the containment time is no more than 90 days in these 58
entries. The average value of containment time is equal to 10.4504 days. In Figure 3(b), we
take a closer look at the containment times which are lower than the average value. Here we
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Figure 3: Distribution of Containment Time
can observe that the containment time is within 1 day for 22.41% of these incidents. Note
that a short containment time also implies a short discovery time (since containment time
indicates initial compromise to containment/restoration).
Table 3 shows the values of containment time alongside with incident time, discovery
time, and exfiltration time. According to the definition of the containment time in VERIS,
we expected that the value of the containment time should be higher than the discovery
time. (Containment time is equal to initial compromise to containment/restoration, while
discovery time is the duration of initial compromise to incident discovery.) But, as we can
observe in Table 3, in many incidents, the value of containment time is lower than the value
of discovery time. We believe that many reporters interpreted containment time as the time
that a victim organization spent to recover its system from an incident. Therefore, the value
of the containment time may actually more adequately reflect the notion of reaction time in
our model.
It is worth mentioning that in the context of phishing, it is possible to calculate the
average of the reaction time according to Moore and Clayton [25], who calculate the mean
and median values of phishing sites’ lifetime in hours.
By studying the VCDB and only focusing on “Hacking” and “Malware” incidents, we
are limited to a small set of values for discovery time. Unfortunately, for the other two
11
Incident Time Discovery Time Containment Time Exfiltration Time
5/4/2001 Minutes 15 Days -
2004 2 Months 1 Month -
5/2005 18 Months 2 Months -
4/17/2011 Days 2 Days -
9/2012 6 Months 3 Months -
2/15/2013 4 Days 1 Day -
4/13/2013 2 Weeks 2 Days -
6/24/2013 3 Days 3 Days -
7/2013 6 Months 8 Days -
8/26/2013 Minutes 1 Hour -
8/29/2013 Hours 1 Day -
9/3/2013 2 Days 1 Day -
9/8/2013 Minutes 8 Hours -
10/5/2013 Minutes 9 Hours -
11/2013 Seconds 2 Months -
12/8/2013 Seconds 3 Hours -
12/28/2013 6 Months 2 Weeks -
2/18/2014 Seconds 2 Days -
3/23/2014 Seconds 6 Hours -
3/24/2014 Seconds 2 Hours -
6/16/2014 6 Weeks 3 Months -
3/27/2014 Seconds 90 Minutes -
7/3/2014 Minutes 1 Day -
8/1/2014 Minutes 2 Hours -
9/1/2014 2 Years 1 Month -
10/6/2014 6 Years 2 Days -
2/14/2015 3 Months 3 Days -
4/15/2015 1 Year 15 Days 2 Months
5/22/2015 1 Month 1 Day -
5/2015 Minutes 2 Weeks -
6/15/2015 Minutes 3 Days -
7/31/2015 3 Weeks 2 Days -
8/2015 2 Years 1 month -
11/24/2015 10 Days 16 Days -
Table 3: Containment Time
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important factors, i.e., protection time and the reaction time, the VCDB does not provide
information in an obvious fashion. Figure 3 may suggest that the reaction time is very fast,
but there are two issues. First, the number of entries with containment time is quite small.
Second, containment time is the sum of discovery time and reaction time and we do not have
the discovery time for these entries.
In order to seek additional insights into the values of protection time, discovery time, and
reaction time, we also studied the Web Hacking Incidents Database (WHID) [38] and the
dataset published by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse [31]. None of these two databases
provide information about these values. Further, Kuypers et al. [16] investigate the statistical
characteristics of sixty thousand cybersecurity incidents for one large organization over the
course of six years. In this dataset, each incident has a field showing the duration of man-
hours that were required to investigate that incident. The authors also suggest that this
dataset includes the time spent for remediation. We anticipate, if this dataset would be
made publicly available, one would potentially calculate the value of reaction time as well as
discovery time for this specific organization. Another report by Damballa [5] demonstrated
that the typical gap between malware release and detection/remediation using antivirus is
54 days. The study was comprised of over 200,000 malware samples scanned by a leading
industry antivirus tool over six months. The study also revealed that almost half of the
200,000 malware samples were not detected on the day they were received, and 15% of the
samples remained undetected after 180 days.
In summary, while on the first glance the VCDB provides a significant amount of data for
cybersecurity incidents, the actual details with respect to timing information are insufficient
to draw robust conclusions. More special domain data sources, e.g., for phishing [25], may
exist, but we are unaware of any larger efforts to collect timing data. We consider this
state-of-affairs a significant omission of cybersecurity-related data collection and want to
encourage further work in this direction.
At the same time, the lack of empirical data emphasizes the importance of theoretical
13
models to understand the timing aspects of strategic security scenarios. In what follows, we
describe our model of Time-Based Security to advance this research field.
4 System Model
In this section, we propose our model for the Time-Based Security (TBS) approach following
the tradition of game theory. Our model is an infinite two-player game between a Defender
(D) and an Attacker (A) competing with each other to control the defender’s resource for a
large portion of time, while incorporating the key characteristics derived from TBS. Note that
each player’s action to change the ownership of the resource is costly. The attacker’s cost to
compromise the defender’s system is represented by cA. Likewise, cD denotes the defender’s
cost to reset the state of the system from compromised to safe. Further, we differentiate
between the defender’s move to check the state of the resource and the defender’s move to
reset the resource to a safe state. In what follows, we call the former the defender’s check
and the latter one the defender’s reset. We denote the defender’s cost to discover whether
its system has been compromised, i.e., check, as ck.
In this paper, we focus our analysis on the case of a periodically acting attacker and a
periodically acting defender. The defender’s periodic resource checking, although stationary
in nature, partially addresses the defender’s uncertainty regarding resource management by
creating predictable schedules. For example, it is easier for system administrators to deal
with periodic comprehensive security risk evaluations. Further, Farhang and Grossklags [7]
provide two data examples, Microsoft’s security policy updates and Oracle’s critical patch
updates, to show that in practice, several major software vendor organizations update their
security policies in a periodic manner. We denote the periodicity of the attacker attempt-
ing to compromise the system, and the defender to check whether the system has been
compromised with tA and tD, respectively.
While the defender checks the resource in a periodic manner, the defender’s reset is
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conditioned on an attack’s detection. The defender requires d amount of time to detect that
the system is compromised after the attacker spends p amount of time to execute the attack
successfully. Note that here we propose a pessimistic model for the defender. The defender
cannot detect the attacks that are in progress. In other words, only if the defender starts
the discovery process after the attacker completely compromised the defender’s system, the
attack will be detected. At the beginning of the game, the defender checks the state of
the resource within interval [0, tD], and the attacker moves within interval [0, tA] (both with
uniform distribution). Hence, each player does not know the exact time of the other player’s
move; even if they exactly know the values of the parameters forming the game.
Moreover, we assume that the values of p, d, and r are constant for the sake of analysis.
It is easy to see that from a defender’s point of view a system with a small protection time,
but large discovery time and large reaction time should be considered unfavorable. Note
that in our data analysis in Section 3, we provide a distribution for the discovery time. Here,
we do not consider the probabilistic nature of this parameter, but we believe our analysis is
an important first step to move towards a comprehensive model for the time-based security
approach. Further, in practice, there is a possibility that after spending a certain amount of
time, i.e., d, the defender may not be able to detect an attack. We exclude this possibility
from our current model and will consider it in future work.
Note that an attacker’s action during the defender’s reaction time will not lead to a
successful attack. In other words, the attacker’s action in this time interval is ineffective.
The reasoning behind this consideration is that during the reaction time, the defender’s
system is changed to a new safe state. As the attacker’s action is based on the previous
defender’s state, it may not be compatible with the updated/reset defender’s system.
According to our model description and parameters, for the rational attacker we have
tA ≥ p + d + r, since the defender’s moves are conditioned on detection (d amount of time
after the attack’s success) and the attacker’s attack will be successful p units of time after
the attack. Further, if the defender moves right after the detection, the resource still belongs
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to the attacker for r units of time. Therefore, tA should be higher than or equal to p + d + r.
Similarly, for the defender, we also have tD ≥ p + d + r.
To calculate both players’ average payoff functions, we need to derive the average time
that each player controls the resource minus the average cost of each player’s actions over
time. In doing so, the general payoff functions are as follows:
uD (tD, tA) = τDi − cD
δDi
− ck
tD
, (1)
uA (tD, tA) = (1− τDi)− cA
tA
. (2)
Where τDi represents the average fraction of time that the defender controls the resource.
It is obvious that the attacker controls the resource for the rest of the time, i.e., 1− τDi. We
use subscript i to differentiate among different cases in our payoff calculations. The time
between two consecutive resets by the defender is denoted by δD and the defender’s average
cost rate over time is equal to (cD/δDi + ck/tD). Likewise, the average cost rate for the
attacker is equal to cA/tA.
We identify six different cases which we discuss in the following. To calculate the payoff
functions for these cases, we need to calculate τD and δD. Table 4 summarizes the notations,
we have used in our model.
Case 1: tD ≤ tA − p− d− r
The above condition also implies that tD < tA and the defender’s discovery move occurs
at least once between the attacker’s two consecutive moves. Consider a given attacker move
interval [t, t+ tA]. In this interval, the defender’s discovery move can occur either during the
protection time or after the protection time which results in two sub-cases.
Case 1.1: Let x = p
tD
. The probability that the defender’s discovery move occurs
during the protection time is equal to x. According to our game definition, the defender
cannot detect this attack. However, the defender’s next discovery move occurs before the
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Table 4: Summary of notations
Variable Definition
p Protection time
d Detection/discovery time
r Reaction time
cD Defender’s cost to reset the system’s state
ck Defender’s cost to check the state of the system
cA Attacker’s cost to compromise the defender
tD Time between two consecutive checks by the defender
tA Time between two consecutive moves by the attacker
τD Average fraction of time that the defender controls the resource
δD Average time between the defender’s two consecutive reset moves
uD Defender’s utility
uA Attacker’s utility
attacker’s next attack, since tD + p + d + r ≤ tA. Further, both the defender’s detection
and effectiveness of the reset occur before the next move by the attacker. Therefore, in each
attacker move interval, the defender only resets the resource once, i.e., δD11 = tA.
Further, in order to calculate our payoff functions, we need to calculate the average
fraction of time that each player controls the resource. Consider a given attacker move
interval [t, t+ tA]. The defender’s discovery move occurs uniformly with probability x during
the protection time. This discovery move of the defender does not result in the detection and
the attacker is the owner of the resource until the successful discovery and the corresponding
defensive reset action. Therefore, the average time that the attacker controls the resource is
equal to TA11 = tD + d + r− p2 .4 For the remainder of the time, the resource belongs to the
defender, i.e., TD11 = tA − TA11. Dividing these two values by tA gives the average fraction
of time that each player controls the resource. Therefore, we have τD11 =
TD11
tA
.
Case 1.2: The probability that the defender’s discovery move occurs after the protection
time is equal to 1−x. Thus, the defender can detect and recover its system completely before
4The defender’s first discovery move occurs in interval [t, t + p] uniformly. The next one occurs in
[t + tD, t + tD + p] and leads to the discovery of the attack. The attacker is the owner of the resource after
the protection time until the defender’s reset move becomes effective, i.e., the defender’s defensive move is
effective in the interval [t + tD + d+ r, t + tD + p+ d+ r]. Due to the defender’s uniform move in the
protection time, the attacker is the owner of the resource for tD + d+ r+
p
2 − p on average.
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the launch of the next attack. Hence, in each attacker’s interval of two consecutive moves,
the defender only resets the resource once, i.e., δD12 = tA.
The attacker is the owner of the resource after the protection time until the discovery
move results in detection and the defensive move results in complete system recovery (that
is, reaction time has passed). The average time that the attacker controls the resource is
TA12 =
tD−p
2
+ d + r.5 The rest of the time, the resource belongs to the defender, i.e.,
TD12 = tA − TA12. Dividing these two values by tA gives the average fraction of time that
each player controls the resource. Therefore, we have τD12 =
TD12
tA
.
For this case, we have considered two sub-cases. To combine these two sub-cases, we take
the expected value with respect to the probability of each sub-case. Therefore, we have:
δD1 = xδD11 + (1− x) δD12 = tA. (3)
The above formula shows that the defender resets the resource only once when the time
between two consecutive discovery moves is low enough, i.e., tD ≤ tA − p− d− r.
In a similar way, to calculate τD1 we have:
τD1 = xτD11 + (1− x) τD12 =
p
(
tA − tD + p2 − d− r
)
tDtA
+
(tD − p)
(
tA − tD2 + p2 − d− r
)
tDtA
=
tA − tD2 − d− r
tA
. (4)
It is interesting to observe that in this case, the average fraction of time that the defender
possesses the resource, i.e., τD1, does not explicitly depend on the protection time. However,
this case’s condition depends on the value of p. The above formula shows that the lower
the values of d and r, the larger the amount of time that the defender controls the resource.
In other words, when the defender checks the state of the resource fast enough, i.e., tD ≤
5The defender’s discovery move occurs in the interval [t+p, t+ tD] uniformly. Given that the defender’s
discovery move is distributed uniformly at random, half of this time interval belongs to the attacker plus the
detection and the reaction time.
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tA − p− d− r, the defender’s utility is not affected by the protection time. It is rather
affected by the discovery time and the reaction time. Influencing the latter factors should
then be the focus of attention for a rational defender.
By incorporating these two equations, i.e., δD1 (Equation 3) and τD1 (Equation 4), into
Equations 1 and 2, we can calculate both players’ payoff functions.
Case 2: tA − p− d− r ≤ tD ≤ tA − d− r
Similar to the previous case, the defender’s discovery move occurs either during the
protection time or after the protection time. Thus, we consider two sub-cases as follows.
Case 2.1: Let x = p
tD
. The probability that the defender’s discovery move occurs during
the protection time is equal to x. According to our game definition, the defender cannot
detect an attack that is in progress. Now, consider a given attacker move interval [t, t+ tA].
The defender’s discovery move occurs uniformly with probability x during the protection
time interval, i.e., [t, t+p], which is not effective. The next defender’s discovery move occurs
in interval [t+ tD, t+ tD + p]. This discovery move results in the detection of the attack and
initiates the defensive move. The defensive move is effective after the reaction time which is
in interval [t+ tD + d + r, t+ tD + p + d + r]. However, some of the defensive moves in this
interval are effective before the attacker’s next attack and some of them are after the next
attacker’s move, since tA ≤ tD + p + d + r. In other words, for the fraction of this interval,
the attacker’s next move is not effective since it occurs during either the reaction time or
the detection time. Therefore, the defender’s defensive move occurs once in tA or 2tA.
The probability that the defender’s defensive move occurs only once in each tA is equal
to a21 =
tA−tD−d−r
p
.6 The rest of the time, i.e., a22 = 1 − a21, the defender’s reset occurs
once in each 2tA. Therefore, on average, we have δD21 = a21tA + a222tA.
To calculate the average fraction of time that each player controls the resource, we dif-
6a21 represents the fraction of the defender’s move during the protection time that results in exactly one
defensive move in each tA. The first discovery move is not effective, since it occurs during the protection
time. The second discovery move results in detection and the defensive move. Those defensive moves that
are in interval [t + tD + d+ r, t + tA] result in one defensive move in each tA (the length of this interval is
equal to tA − tD − d− r).
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ferentiate between the cases when the defender’s defensive move is effective in tA and 2tA.
When this time is equal to tA, consider a given attacker move interval [t, t + tA]. Then,
the attacker is the owner of the resource after the protection time until the defensive move
becomes effective. The defensive move is effective in interval [t + tD + d + r, t + tA] uni-
formly. On average, the attacker is the owner of the resource for half of this time interval
plus the time before the defense effectiveness except the protection time. Hence, we have
TA211 =
tA+tD+d+r
2
− p. And the defender is the owner of the resource for the rest of the
time, i.e., TD121 = tA − TA211 . Dividing these two values by tA gives the average fraction
of time that each player controls the resource. Therefore, we have τD211 =
TD211
tA
. When
each defensive move occurs in 2tA, consider an interval of two consecutive moves for the
attacker [t, t + 2tA]. In a similar way, we have TA122 =
tA+tD+d+r−p
2
, TD122 = 2tA − TA212 ,
and τD212 =
TD212
2tA
. To combine these two cases and calculate τD21, we take an average based
on the fraction of time that each of these cases occurs, i.e., τD21 = a21τD211 + a22τD212 .
Case 2.2: Here, the defender’s discovery move occurs after the protection time. This
case is similar to sub-case 1.2, and we therefore omit its detailed representation.
By combining these two sub-cases, we have:
δD2 = xδD21 + (1− x) δD22 = x (a21 + 2a22) tA + (1− x) tA = 2tA −
(
tA − p− d− r
tD
)
tA.
(5)
According to the above equation, the average time between the defender’s two consecutive
defensive moves is tA ≤ δD2 ≤ 2tA and it depends on tA, p, d, and r.
τD2 = xτD21 + (1− x) τD22 = x (a21τD211 + a22τD212) + (1− x) τD22 =
1
4tAtD
(−t2A − t2D + 4tAtD + 2ptA − 2tD (d + r) + (p + d + r) (d + r− p)) . (6)
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Contrary to Case 1, the defender’s average fraction of time for controlling the resource
depends on protection time.
Case 3: tA − d− r ≤ tD ≤ tA
Similar to the two previous cases, the defender’s discovery move occurs either during the
protection time or after the protection time. Thus, we consider two sub-cases as follows.
Case 3.1: Let x = p
tD
. Consider a given attacker move interval [t, t+ tA]. The defender’s
discovery move occurs uniformly with probability x during the protection time interval,
i.e., [t, t + p], which is not effective. The next defender’s discovery move occurs in interval
[t + tD, t+ tD + p]. This discovery move results in the detection of the attack and initiates
the defensive move. The defensive move is effective after the reaction time that is in interval
[t+ tD + d + r, t+ tD + p + d + r]. This means that all the defensive moves in this interval
are effective after the attacker’s next move. Thus, the attacker’s next move is not effective.
Therefore, in each 2tA, the defender resets the resource exactly once, i.e., δD31 = 2tA.
To calculate the average time that the attacker controls the resource, note that the
defensive move is effective (after the reaction time) in interval [t+tD+d + r, t+tD+p + d + r]
uniformly. Half of this time interval belongs to the attacker on average. Moreover, the
attacker is the owner of the resource after the protection time until the defensive move’s
effectiveness. Therefore, we have TA31 = tD + d + r− p2 . The rest of the time, the defender
is the owner of the resource, i.e., TD31 = 2tA − TA31. Thus, we have τD31 = TD312tA .
Case 3.2: Consider a given attacker move interval [t, t + tA]. The probability that the
defender’s discovery move occurs after the protection time interval, i.e., [t + p, t + tD], is
equal to 1 − x. The defender’s discovery move in this interval results in detection and the
defensive move. The defensive move is effective in interval [t+ p + d + r, t+ tD + d + r]. A
defensive move may be effective after the attacker’s next attack, since tA ≤ tD + d + r, and
the attacker’s next move will not be successful. Hence, the defender’s defensive move occurs
once in tA or 2tA. Similar to case 2.1, the fraction of time that the defender’s defensive
move occurs only once in each tA is equal to a31 =
tA−p−d−r
tD−p . The rest of the time, i.e.,
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a32 = 1 − a31, the defender’s defensive move occurs once in each 2tA. Therefore, we have
δD32 = a31tA + a322tA.
To calculate the average fraction of time that each player controls the resource, we differ-
entiate between the cases when the defender’s defensive move occurs in tA and 2tA. When
this time is equal to tA, consider a given attacker move interval [t, t+tA]. The attacker is the
owner of the resource after the protection time until the defensive move becomes effective.
The defensive move is effective in interval [t+ p + d + r, t+ tA] uniformly. On average, the
attacker is the owner of the resource for half of this time interval plus the time before the
defense effectiveness except the protection time. Hence, we have TA321 =
tA+p+d+r
2
− p.
And the defender is the owner for the remainder, i.e., TD321 = tA − TA321 . Dividing these
two values by tA gives the average fraction of time that each player controls the resource.
Therefore, we have τD321 =
TD321
tA
.
When the defensive move occurs in each 2tA, consider a given two consecutive moves
interval for the attacker [t, t + 2tA]. In a similar way, we have TA322 =
tA+tD+d+r
2
− p,
TD322 = 2tA − TA322 , and τD322 = TD3222tA . To combine these two cases and calculate τD32, we
take an average based on the fraction of time that each of these cases occurs, i.e., τD32 =
a31τD321 + a32τD322 .
By combining these two sub-cases we have:
δD3 = xδD31 + (1− x) δD32 = x2tA + (1− x) (a31 + 2a32) tA = 2tA −
(
tA − p− d− r
tD
)
tA.
(7)
One of the boundary points for this case is tA = tD. Inserting tA = tD in the above
equation gives that δD3 = tD + p + d + r. One might expect that for tA = tD, the value of
τD3 should be equal to tA. Note that here, we want to calculate the average time between
the defender’s two consecutive defensive moves. When tA = tD, if the defender’s discovery
move occurs after the attack success, the defensive move occurs in each tA. But, if the
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discovery move occurs during the protection time, the defensive move occurs once in each
2tA. Therefore, the average value is not equal to tA.
τD3 = xτD31 + (1− x) τD32 = xτD31 + (1− x) (a31τD321 + a32τD322) =
1
4tAtD
(−t2A − t2D + 4tAtD + 2ptA − 2tD (d + r) + (p + d + r) (d + r− p)) . (8)
Note that the above two values are the same as what we have calculated for Case 2. It
is interesting to see that while the situation for each case’s payoff calculation is different, it
yields the same values for both cases’ payoff functions.
Case 4: tA ≤ tD ≤ tA + p
The above condition implies that the attacker moves once or twice in a given discovery
move interval, because we have tD ≥ tA and tD ≤ tA + p < 2tA (note that we assume
tA ≥ p + d + r). Consider a given discovery move interval [t, t+tD]. The defender’s discovery
move at an arbitrary time t results in detection and the defensive move. Based on the attack
occurrence during this interval, we consider three sub-cases.
Case 4.1: Let y1 =
d+r
tA
. The probability that the attacker’s move occurs within the
d + r amount of time after the discovery move is equal to y1. The attacker’s move during
this interval does not lead to a successful attack, since the defender’s discovery move at time
t yields the detection and the defensive move.
The next attacker’s move occurs in interval [t+ tA, t+ tA + d + r]. The attacker has to
spend p amount of time to execute its attack successfully. Thus, all of the attacker’s moves
in this interval are successful after the defender’s next discovery move. The next discovery
move does not lead to the detection and the defensive move. Consequently, in each 2tD, the
defender resets the resource only once, i.e., τD41 = 2tD.
The defender is the owner of the resource after the defensive move is effective, i.e., t+d + r
has elapsed, until the attacker completely compromises the defender’s system. The attacker’s
23
move effectiveness is uniformly occurring in interval [t + tA + p, t + tA + p + d + r]. Due
to the uniform distribution, half of this time interval belongs to the defender on average.
Therefore, we have TD41 = tA + p− d+r2 and τD41 = TD412tD . The rest belongs to the attacker
which is equal to TA41 = 2tD − TD41.
Case 4.2: Let y2 =
tD−p−d−r
tA
. The probability that the attacker can successfully com-
promise the defender’s resource completely before the next discovery move is equal to y2.
7
In this case, the defender can detect the attack by its next discovery move which means that
the defensive move occurs once in each tD, i.e., δD42 = tD.
The defender is the owner of the resource after its defensive move is effective, i.e., t +
d + r has elapsed, until the attacker completely compromises the defender’s system. The
attacker’s move effectiveness is uniformly occurring in interval [t + p + d + r, t + tD]. Due
to uniform distribution, half of this interval belongs to the defender. Therefore, we have
TD42 =
tD+p−d−r
2
and τD42 =
TD42
tD
. The rest belongs to the attacker, i.e., TA42 = tD − TD42.
Case 4.3: Let y3 = 1 − y1 − y2 = tA−tD+ptA . The probability that the attacker moves
in interval [t + tD − p, t + tA] is equal to y3. The attacker’s move in this interval will be
successful after the defender’s next discovery move. Therefore, we have τD43 = 2tD.
The defender is the owner of the resource after its defensive move’s effectiveness, i.e.,
t+ d + r has passed, until the attacker completely compromises the defender’s system. The
attacker’s move effectiveness is uniformly occurring in interval [t + tD, t + tD + p]. Due
to the uniform distribution, half of this interval belongs to the defender. Therefore, we
have TD43 =
tD+tA+p
2
− d− r and τD43 = TD432tD . The rest belongs to the attacker, i.e.,
TA43 = 2tD − TD43.
Similar to the previous cases, for δD4 and τD4, we have:
δD4 = y1δD41 + y2δD42 + y3δD43 = 2tD −
(
tD − p− d− r
tA
)
tD. (9)
7If the attacker moves in interval [t + d+ r, t + tD − p], the attacker’s attack is successful before the
defender’s next discovery move at t + tD. Note that the attacker requires p amount of time to compromise
the defender’s system.
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τD4 = y1τD41 + y2τD42 + y3τD43 =
1
4tAtD
(
t2A + t
2
D + 2ptA − 2tD (d + r) + (p + d + r) (d + r− p)
)
. (10)
Case 5: tA + p ≤ tD ≤ tA + p + d + r
Similar to the previous case, the attacker moves once or twice in a given discovery move
interval. For a given discovery move interval [t, t + tD], the defender’s discovery move at
time t results in discovery and the defensive move. Based on attack occurrence, we have two
sub-cases.
Case 5.1: Let y1 =
d+r
tA
. The probability that the attacker’s move occurs within d + r
amount of time after the discovery move is equal to y1. The attacker’s move during this
interval does not lead to a successful attack, since the defender’s discovery move at time t
yields to the detection and the defensive move.
The next attacker’s move occurs in interval [t + tA, t + tA + d + r]. The attacker has
to spend p amount of time to execute its attack successfully. Thus, part of the attacker’s
move in this interval are successful after the defender’s next discovery move, i.e., interval
[t + tD, t + tA + p + d + r], and the next discovery move does not result in detection and
the defensive move. Consequently, the defender resets the resource in each tD or 2tD. If
the attacker’s next attack is successful in the interval [t + tA + p, t + tD], the defender’s
defensive move occurs in each tD. The probability that the attacker’s move occurs in this
interval in this sub-case, which is distributed uniformly, is equal to a51 =
tD−tA−p
d+r
. On
average, half of this time interval belongs to the defender plus the time after the defender’s
defense effectiveness at time t + d + r until the successful compromise. Therefore, we have
TD511 =
tA+tD+p
2
− d− r and τD511 = TD511tD .
In a similar way, if the attacker’s next move is successful in the interval [t+ tD, t+ tA +
p + d + r], the defender’s defensive move occurs in each 2tD. The attacker’s move occurs in
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this interval with probability a52 = 1− a51. On average, half of this time interval belongs to
the defender plus the time after the defender’s defense effectiveness at time t + d + r until
the successful compromise. Therefore, we have TD512 =
tA+tD+p−d−r
2
and τD512 =
TD512
2tD
. By
combining these two scenarios, we have δD51 = a51tD+a522tD and τD51 = a51τD511 +a52τD512 .
Case 5.2: Let y = 1 − y1. The probability that the attacker moves after the defensive
move, i.e., interval [t + d + r, t + tA], is equal to y. The defender can detect the attacks
occurring in this interval, since tA + p ≤ tD. Thus, the defender resets the resource in each
tD, i.e., δD52 = tD. Similar to the previous cases, we have TD52 =
tA−d−r
2
+p and τD52 =
TD52
tD
.
For δD5 and τD5, we have:
δD5 = y1δD51 + yδD52 = y1 (a51 + 2a52) tD + ytD = 2tD −
(
tD − p− d− r
tA
)
tD, (11)
and
τD5 = y1τD51 + yτD52 = y1 (a51τD511 + a52τD512) + yτD52
=
1
4tAtD
(
t2A + t
2
D + 2ptA − 2tD (d + r) + (p + d + r) (d + r− p)
)
. (12)
Note that both Case 4 and Case 5 result in the same payoff functions.
Case 6: tD ≥ tA + p + d + r
Consider a given discovery move interval [t, t + tD]. The attacker moves in the interval
[t + d + r, t + tD − p] at least once, since tD ≥ tA + p + d + r. Hence, the attacker’s move
in this interval is detected in each tD and we have δD6 = tD.
After the defensive move occurs successfully, i.e., t+d + r has passed, the defender is the
owner of the resource until the successful compromise occurs. The attacker moves in interval
[t+ d + r, t+ tA + d + r] with uniform distribution. Half of this time interval belongs to the
defender plus the protection time. In other words, we have TD6 =
tA
2
+ p and τD6 =
TD6
tD
.
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δD6 = tD. (13)
τD6 =
tA + 2p
2tD
. (14)
According to the equation above, the average fraction of time does not depend on dis-
covery time and the reaction time when the time between two consecutive discovery moves
is high enough, i.e., tD ≥ tA + p + d + r. This means that if the defender does not check its
system state regularly, in order to increase its utility, the defender should only invest in in-
creasing the protection time. Other parameters are not important. Furthermore, according
to Equation 13, the average time between the defender’s two consecutive resets is equal to
the time between two consecutive discovery moves.
5 Analytical Results
In this section, we analyze our proposed game and, in particular, provide both players’ best
responses.
In order to calculate the defender’s best response, first, we define the following three
points in Definition 1.
Definition 1 For given tA, points t¯D1, t¯D2, and t¯D3 are calculated as follows:
- t¯D1 =
√
2tAck if t¯D1 ≥ p + d + r and t¯D1 ≤ tA − p− d− r.
- The solution of the following equation in tD, i.e., t¯D2, if t¯D2 ≥ p + d + r and tA −
p− d− r ≤ t¯D2 ≤ tA:
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ck
t2D
+
cD (tA − p− d− r)
tA (2tD − tA + p + d + r)2
+
1
4tAt2D
(−t2D + t2A − 2ptA − (p + d + r) (d + r− p)) = 0. (15)
- The solution of the following equation in tD, i.e., t¯D3, if tA ≤ t¯D3 ≤ tA + p + d + r:
ck
t2D
+
cDtA
t2D (2tA − tD + p + d + r)
− cDtA
tD (2tA − tD + p + d + r)2
+
1
4tAt2D
(
t2D − t2A − 2ptA − (p + d + r) (d + r− p)
)
= 0 (16)
In the above definition, each point represents the critical point of a case. t¯D1 represents
the defender’s critical point for case 1. t¯D2 represents the defender’s critical point for cases
2 and 3. t¯D3 is the critical point for the defender’s payoff in cases 4 and 5. These points in
addition to the boundary points of each case provide the entire set of possible best responses
by the defender.
Definition 2 The members of set S(tA) are defined as follows:
S(tA) = {t¯D1, t¯D2, t¯D3,p + d + r, tA − p− d− r, tA, tA + p + d + r}.
Theorem 1 represents the defender’s best response.
Theorem 1 For each value of tA, the defender’s best response is calculated as follows:
BRD(tA) = arg max
tD∈S
uD (tD, tA) . (17)
Proof. To show our results, we identify the defender’s maximum points for each case and
then compare the resulting payoffs of these points to each other to find the point yielding the
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highest payoff. This point is the defender’s best response for a corresponding tA. For each
case, we take the partial derivative from Equation 1 with respect to tD which is represented
in the following equation and set the partial derivative to zero to find critical points.
∂uD(tD, tA)
∂tD
=
∂τDi
∂tD
+
cD
(δDi)
2
(
∂δDi
∂tDi
)
+
ck
t2D
. (18)
Case 1: Setting Equation 18 to zero gives t¯D1. The defender’s payoff function in case 1
is increasing in [0, t¯D1] and decreasing in [t¯D1,∞]. Hence, the defender’s payoff function is
maximized at median{p + d + r, t¯D1, tA − p− d− r}, where median is a middle value of a
set.
Case 2 and Case 3: Setting Equation 18 to zero gives Equation 15. The solution
of this equation, i.e., t¯D2, gives the critical point(s) of the defender’s payoff function if
tA − p− d− r ≤ t¯D2 ≤ tA. Therefore, we should compare the defender’s payoff at t¯D2 with
tA and tA − p− d− r to find the local maximum.
Case 4 and Case 5: In a similar way, by taking the partial derivative from the defender’s
payoff function in Case 4 and Case 5 with respect to tD and setting it to zero we have
Equation 16. The solution of this equation, i.e., t¯D3 is extremum if tA ≤ t¯D3 ≤ tA +
p + d + r. In order to find the maximum for this case, we compare the defender’s payoffs
at tA, tA + p + d + r, and t¯D3 with each other. The point with the highest payoff is the
maximum for this case.
Case 6: In this case, the defender’s payoff is decreasing in tD. Thus, the defender’s
payoff is maximized at tA + p + d + r.
By comparing the resulting payoffs of different cases, the one with the highest payoff
provides the defender’s best response for given value of tA.
In order to calculate the attacker’s best response, we follow an equivalent approach as
utilized for the defender’s best response (see Theorem 1). First, we identify the attacker’s
possible best responses for each case, and then compare them in order to identify the at-
tacker’s best response.
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Definition 3 For given tD, points t¯A1, t¯A2, and t¯A3 are calculated as follows:
- t¯A1 =
√
2tDcA if t¯A1 ≥ p + d + r.
- The solution of the following equation in tA, i.e., t¯A2, if tD ≤ t¯A1 ≤ tD + p + d + r:
cA
t2A
− t
2
D − t2A + 2 (d + r) tD − (p + d + r) (d + r− p)
4t2AtD
= 0. (19)
- The solution of the following equation in tA, i.e., t¯A3, if t¯A3 ≥ p + d + r and tD −
p− d− r ≤ t¯A3 ≤ tD:
cA
t2A
− t
2
A − t2D + 2 (d + r) tD − (p + d + r) (d + r− p)
4t2AtD
= 0. (20)
In the above definition, each point represents the critical point of a case. t¯A1 represents
the attacker’s critical point for case 6. t¯A2 represents the attacker’s critical point for cases
2 and 3. t¯A3 is the critical point for the attacker’s payoff in cases 4 and 5. These points in
addition to the boundary points of each case provide the entire set of possible best responses
by the defender.
Definition 4 The members of set V(tD) are defined as follows:
V(tD) = {t¯A1, t¯A2, t¯A3,p + d + r, tD − p− d− r, tD, tD + p + d + r}.
Theorem 2 represents the attacker’s best response.
Theorem 2 For each value of tD, the attacker’s best response is calculated as follows:
BRA(tD) = arg max
tA∈V
uA (tD, tA) . (21)
Proof. To show our results, we identify the attacker’s maximum points for each case and
then compare the resulting payoffs of these points to each other to find the point yielding the
highest payoff. This point is the attacker’s best response for a corresponding tD. For each
30
case, we take the partial derivative from Equation 2 with respect to tA which is represented
in the following equation and set the partial derivative to zero to find critical points.
∂uA(tD, tA)
∂tA
= −∂τDi
∂tD
+
cA
t2A
. (22)
Case 1: In this case, the attacker’s payoff is decreasing in tA. Thus, the attacker’s payoff
is maximized at tD + p + d + r.
Case 2 and Case 3: Setting Equation 22 to zero gives Equation 19. The solution of
this equation, i.e., t¯A2, gives the critical point(s) of the attacker’s payoff function if tD ≤
t¯A2 ≤ tD + p + d + r. Therefore, we should compare the attacker’s payoff at t¯A2 with tD
and tD + p + d + r to find the local maximum.
Case 4 and Case 5: In a similar way, by taking the partial derivative from the attacker’s
payoff function in Case 4 and Case 5 with respect to tA and setting it to zero gives Equa-
tion 20. The solution of this equation, i.e., t¯A3 is extremum if tD − p− d− r ≤ t¯A3 ≤ tD.
In order to find the maximum for this case, we compare the defender’s payoffs at tD,
tD − p− d− r, and t¯A3 with each other. The point with the highest payoff is the max-
imum for this case.
Case 6: Setting Equation 22 to zero gives t¯A1. The attacker’s payoff function in Case
1 is increasing in [0, t¯A1] and decreasing in [t¯A1,∞]. Hence, the attacker’s payoff function is
maximized at median{p + d + r, t¯A1, tD − p− d− r}, where median is a middle value of a
set.
By comparing the resulting payoff of all cases, the one with the highest payoff provides
the attacker’s best response for given value of tA.
6 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we evaluate our findings numerically. First, we study the effect of p, d, and r
on both players’ best responses. Second, we consider the effect of cD and ck on the defender’s
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Figure 4: Players’ best responses for different values of d. We have cD = 2, ck = 5, cA = 0.5,
p = 3, and r = 1.
best response. Third, we investigate the role of cA on the attacker’s best response. Then,
we investigate the existence of Nash equilibria in our proposed game.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) represent the defender’s and the attacker’s best responses for
different values of d, respectively. For these two plots, we have p = 3, r = 1, cD = 2, ck = 5,
and cA = 0.5. Note that we assume that tA ≥ p + d + r and tD ≥ p + d + r. For each
curve, we plot each player’s best response in interval [p + d + r, 7 (p + d + r)]. Therefore,
each curve starts and ends at different points. Based on Figure 4(a), for low values of tA, the
defender’s best response is equal to tA + p + d + r. The higher the detection time, the less
often the defender checks the state of its resource. But, when tA is large, i.e., the attacker
moves slowly, the defender’s best response is equal to
√
2cktA, which is independent from p,
d, and r. For the attacker’s best response, when tD is small, the attacker’s best response is
equal to tD + p + d + r. For higher values of tD, the attacker’s best response is equal to tD
and for even higher values, the attacker’s best response is the solution of Equation 20. If tD
is high enough, the attacker’s best response is equal to p + d + r. Therefore, the attacker
moves slower, i.e., higher values of tA, when d is higher.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) represent the defender’s best response and the attacker’s best
response for different values of p, respectively. Here, we have cD = 10, ck = 5, cA = 0.5,
d = 10, and r = 1. Similar to the previous figure, when the value of p increases, attacker and
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Figure 5: Players’ best responses for different values of p. We have cD = 10, ck = 5,
cA = 0.5, d = 10, and r = 1.
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Figure 6: Players’ best responses for different values of r. We have cD = 2, ck = 5, cA = 0.5,
d = 10, and p = 3.
defender do not decrease tA and tD, respectively. For the attacker, the higher the value of
the protection time, the slower is the attacker’s move pattern. The defender moves slower for
higher values of protection time, if the attacker moves fast enough. Otherwise, the defender
is indifferent, since the defender’s best response is equal to
√
2cktA, which is independent
from p, d, and r.
Figure 6 represents the effect of the reaction time on both players’ best responses, which
is similar to the two previous figures considering the effect of protection time and discovery
time.
Figure 7(a) represents the role of ck on the defender’s best response. As we see in this
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Figure 7: Defender’s best responses for different values of and ck and cD. We have cA = 0.5,
d = 10, r = 1, and p = 3.
figure, the defender’s best response is equal to tA + p + d + r for small values of tA, which
is independent from ck. For higher values of ck, the defender’s best response is equal to
tA + p + d + r for higher values of tA. Further, for high values of tA, the defender’s best
response is equal to p + d + r if ck is low enough. Otherwise, the defender’s best response
is equal to
√
2cktA.
In Figure 7(b), we consider the role of cD on the defender’s best response. As we can
observe in this figure, the defender’s best response switches between tA + p + d + r and
√
2tAck which are independent from cD. The only outcome depending on cD can be found
at the point where the defender switches from tD + p + d + r to
√
2tAck. According to this
figure, the defender switches its best response for higher values of tA when cD is higher.
In Figure 8(a), we investigate the role of cA on the attacker’s best response. When the
defender moves fast, the attacker’s best response is tD + p + d + r which is independent
from the attacker’s cost. For higher values of tD, the attacker’s best response depends on
the cost. In general, the higher the cost, the slower is the attacker’s move.
In order to find any Nash equilibria, we calculate the best response of each player and
then find the intersection, which is shown in Figure 8(b). In this figure, we have p = 3,
d = 10, r = 1, ck = 5, cD = 10, and cA = 0.5. According to this figure, the intersection of
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Figure 8: Attacker’s best response for different values of cA and Nash equilibrium
these two curves is at (tA, tD) = (14.9, 28.9). Note that the intersection of these two curves
is at a discontinuity of the attacker’s best response, i.e., the attacker’s best response switches
from one value to another (from one case to another case). However, the attacker’s payoffs
for these two best response strategies (at the discontinuity) are numerically almost equal to
each other, making them strategically equivalent. Note that this is similar to the original
FlipIt game with periodic strategies where there exists an interval in which all points within
the interval yield the same payoff and those points are part of the best response [4, 39]. In
this numerical example, (tA, tD) = (14.9, 28.9) is Nash equilibrium.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first study the VCDB and screen other data sources to shed light on the
question of the actual timing of security incidents and responses. We propose a distribution
for the attack discovery time and provide heuristics about the distribution of the protection
time and the reaction time in practice. While the gathered insights are useful, we assess the
overall state of data collection for timing related data as severely lacking. The terminology
for data collection is ambiguous (or at least seems to be interpreted unevenly by data con-
tributors) and the collected data in the VCDB raises several questions. We are unaware of
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any superior data sources for a broad range of security issues.
Second, we propose a game-theoretic framework for Time-Based Security [36]. In partic-
ular, we aim to provide a richer framework to determine the defender’s best time to reset
the defense mechanism to a known safe state in the presence of a capable stealthy attacker.
We incorporate the notions of protection time, detection time, and reaction time to provide
a more realistic environment for the analysis of security scenarios unfolding over time.
Next to the development of the payoff functions for both players, we analytically de-
termine the defender’s and the attacker’s best responses. We evaluate our game with a
numerical approach and do an example calculation for the corresponding Nash equilibrium
of the game by visualizing both players’ best responses and finding the intersection of these
two plots.
Our analysis is based on several assumptions and therefore provides meaningful oppor-
tunities for follow-up research. In particular, we study the case of the defender and the
attacker acting periodically. While we observe periodic security behaviors in practice (such
as fixed schedules for patch releases, or renewal of passwords and cryptographic keys), the
study of other attacker and defender behaviors is equally well motivated. We anticipate the
further development of Time-Based Security to positively impact the study of security games
of timing, as well as security practice due to the increased relevance of the modeled scenario.
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